Introduction
1.1 Racial profiling is a matter of considerable concern in the U.S. and elsewhere. Yet, perhaps because of its sensitive nature, there is almost no philosophical reflection on this subject.
2 This essay provides a normative assessment of racial profiling and invites more philosophical discussion of this subject. Our argument rests on two assumptions about the productivity of profiling in curbing crime. First, we posit that there is a significant correlation between membership in certain racial groups and the propensity to commit certain crimes. Second, we assume that given such a propensity, to stop, search, or investigate members of such groups differentially will help curb crime. That is, we assume that such measures eliminate more crime than other measures for equivalent 1 We have benefited from conversations about this material with Miriam Avins, Archon Fung, Brian Jacob, Todd Pittinsky, Peter Schuck, Ani Satz, Andrew Williams, and students in a joint class on statistics and ethics at the Kennedy School in October 2002. We are grateful to Arthur Applbaum, Frances Kamm, Simon Keller, Fred Schauer, and Alan Wertheimer for helpful comments. We have benefited from reading unpublished chapters on profiling by Fred Schauer (to appear in Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes, Belknap Press, 2003) . Thanks to Avedis Koutoujian for research assistance.
2 The are exceptions: There is a debate started by Levin (1992) and Thomas (1992) , which includes Adler (1993) , Corlett (1993) , Cox (1993) , and Pojman (1993) , and a reply by Levin (1994) . This discussion addresses response to black crime, rather than profiling in particular. Second, there are the contributions by Wasserman, McGary, and Applbaum in Kleinig (1996) . Legal scholarship is more extensive. See, for example, Gross (2002) and Schuck (2002) for law-oriented views on moral concerns about profiling. 6 We are not concerned with the practice of "profiling" in general: we do not discuss conceptual issues that arise in attempts to analyze profiling as such, nor do we address moral issues that arise on that general level. Both our conceptual analysis and our normative inquiry move at the less abstract level of racial profiling. Schauer's forthcoming Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes addresses the broader issues. One reader suggested the useful distinction between "racial profiling as we know it," which is characterized by all the three features we distinguish above, and "racial profiling as it might be," which uses race for police purposes in ways that strike us as justifiable.
of this debate. 7 Showing why this supposition is false is one task of our analysis. We investigate two argumentative strategies trying to show that profiling is wrong: a utilitarian argument, and multiple non-consequentialist arguments. These arguments fail to defeat the case for profiling. We also investigate an argument in support of profiling based on the self-interest of minorities. While this argument comes with qualifications, it is crucial for our rebuttal of one non-consequentialist objection. The relevant constitutional questions turn on the Fourth Amendment (banning "unreasonable searches and seizures") and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is much debate about the application of these amendments to racial profiling. Yet our concern is with moral issues, rather than with constitutional interpretation.
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Section 2 discusses the defining characteristics of racial profiling. Section 3 elaborates the distinction between racial profiling, police abuse, and disproportionate use of race of screening. Since many discussions of racial profiling suffer from a lack of conceptual clarification, such "stage-setting" is essential: there is no set of useful distinctions in place that we can easily draw on. Readers who have thought a lot about 7 Glasser (2000) , for instance, compares racial profiling with Jim Crow and the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. West (1993) lists examples of how white supremacy lingers, mentioning racial profiling alongside drug convictions and death-row executions (cf. preface to the 2001 edition, p XV, while the preface to the 1994 mentions how West himself was subject to abusive racial profiling). 8 For the legal issues, cf. Banks (2001) , Johnson (1983) , Maclin (1998) , Russell (2001) , Silton (2002) , Stuntz (1998) , Thompson (1999) ; see also Skolnick and Caplovitz (2001) . Some believe that the debate about profiling is really about the truth of the assumptions we are making at the beginning of the introduction. This strikes us as false. There are at least three different debates, each of which significant: the first is about the correlation between race and crime and the effectiveness of profiling; the second is about the legal aspects of such profiling, and the third is about the moral aspects, our concern.
profiling may wish to skim these sections. Section 4 explores the utilitarian argument, and section 5 takes up the non-consequentialist arguments. Section 6 outlines the argument that racial profiling may be in the interest in particular of the African-American community. Section 7 concludes.
Defining Racial Profiling
2.1 The term "racial profiling" was introduced to criticize abusive police practices and thus carries connotations of illegitimacy. 9 Thus, to explore profiling without a bias built into its definition, we must assess how to understand profiling, and how to keep it distinct from other issues.
In a typical approach, Ramirez et al. (2000) define profiling as "any policeinitiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin, rather than the behavior of an individual or information that leads the police to a particular individual who has been identified as being, or having been, engaged in criminal activity." This definition captures a pre-theoretical account many people have. Our definition will be different from this one in a manner that facilitates normative inquiry.
The crucial feature of the Ramirez definition is that it contrasts (a) the use of race, ethnicity, or national origin with (b) the use of the behavior of an individual or information that leads the police to a particular individual who has been identified as being, or having been, engaged in criminal activity. That is, racial profiling relies on (a) rather than (b) . Including this contrast in the definition raises problems for two reasons.
First, (a) mentions a feature of investigative methods, namely, the use of race, ethnicity, 9 Cf. Gross and Livingston (2002) , p 1426 (in particular footnote 53).
or national origin, whereas (b) mentions both a feature of investigative methods ("rely on information pertaining to individuals") and the goal of such investigations, namely the apprehension of criminals. Thus contrasting (a) and (b) suggests that profiling serves purposes other than the apprehension of criminals, and thus gives an aura of illegitimacy to racial profiling by definition. Second, writing the contrast between (a) and (b) into the definition suggests that either one uses race, ethnicity, national origins, and possibly other information about group-membership, or one uses specific information on suspicious activity, namely information about the behavior of an individual or information that leads the police to an individual identified as a criminal. However, we would still need to talk about profiling if a combination of the two criteria motivated action. For example, it would still be profiling if police stopped 40% of blacks exceeding the speed limit by 10 mph but only 20% of whites.
Thus the definition suggested by Ramirez et al. prejudices the moral assessment of racial profiling; nor does it capture some of the moral issues of concern when discussing profiling. In response to these concerns, we define racial profiling as "any police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin and not merely on the behavior of an individual." 10 Our question then is: Are such actions justified under 10 Compare other definition of profiling: Banks (2001) defines racial profiling as follows: "[R]acial profiling constitutes the intentional consideration of race in a manner that disparately impacts certain racial minority groups, contributing to the disproportionate investigation, detention, and mistreatment of innocent members of those groups." So just like Rameriz et al., Banks defines profiling in a manner meant to solicit moral condemnation. Would Banks approve a racial profiling measure that only involved disproportionate investigation of certain groups of citizens? There is no way to know. Compare the definition proposed by Gross and Livingston (2002) , who submit that "'racial profiling' occurs whenever a law enforcement officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a person because the officer believes that members of circumstances that may occur widely? We believe that they are, but our definition of racial profiling alone does not suggest that answer.
2.2 Keeping our definition of racial profiling in mind, we need to specify the focus of our discussion. To begin, we distinguish among three different paradigmatic cases of profiling. We then specify the type of profiling discussed in this study, and how such an inquiry illuminates other types of profiling. The first paradigmatic case of profiling includes measures employing race and ethnicity that seek to apprehend individuals who have committed specific crimes. 11 One example is the search for the DC Sniper in fall
2002. The second includes racial, ethnic, or nationality screening at airports, which has been widely discussed after 9/11. 12 The difference between this kind of case and "Sniperscenarios" is that in airport screening profiling is not used to apprehend individuals who have committed crimes or who are likely soon to do so. Rather, profiling is used because there exists a salient threat (hijacking of planes), and it is deemed impossible or excessively expensive to search all individuals involved in this setting. Screening is used as a routine measure to apprehend individuals who may be planning on committing the that person's racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit the sort of crime that the officer is investigating" (p 1415). By drawing on the individual officer's beliefs, this definition is more exclusive than ours. But defining profiling in this manner is peculiar. What if the officer disagrees with official police policies and thus does not have the relevant belief, but happens to implement it? It might be useful to distinguish between "racial profiling at the policy level," and "an individual police officer's being engaged in racial profiling." There can be the one without the other, but we are interested in profiling at the policy level.
relevant crimes, to deter such people, and to reassure passengers. By way of contrast with the case of stopping people on the highway, to be considered next, this setting is rather confined: such procedures apply only to people about to board a plane, who are in a position to expect such measures and the discomfort that accompanies them. The third case involves search and investigation on highways that relies (in part) on racial criteria, with the goal of intercepting drug traffic, or search and investigation on city streets with the goal of finding, say, illegal weapons. In such cases, the search is not meant to apprehend individuals wanted for specific crimes that were just committed, nor is the search part of routine measures all individuals engaged in certain activities can reasonably expect. In such cases, any particular individual has only a slim chance of being searched. Thus such searches tend to be disruptive and personally troubling, and individuals are in no position to integrate them into a daily routine.
There are many other cases in which profiling is used. These three paradigmatic cases differ in the extent to which a crime or a threat is immediate, in the extent to which security measures can be expected, and in the magnitude of the imposition involved.
Profiling tends to be the more controversial the less immediacy there is to the crime or threat to which it is related, the less one can reasonably expect to be subject to such measures, and the greater their imposition. (Also, profiling tends to be more controversial the less obvious it is -or the less it is the case --that everybody searched is affected by the goal of the investigation, and the greater the magnitude of the possible harm; however, our cases do not make this clear.) Therefore, our argument mostly addresses cases of the third, most controversial sort, such as highway searches. We claim that profiling can be justified even in such cases, and take this to entail that it is justified a fortiori in other cases. Somebody claiming that profiling is justified in the first or second but not in the third, would need to argue for that distinction. This study addresses the routine use of profiling for the prosecution, identification, and prevention of crimes.
3. Racial Profiling, Police Abuse, and Disproportionate Screening 3.1 To focus the discussion further, we address two subjects that tend to be conflated with profiling as we have defined it: police abuse, and disproportionate screening of minorities.
Profiling actions tend to make the headlines mostly when they are coupled with abusive police behavior, whether rude words, demeaning demands, or physical force. As a result, when racial profiling is debated abuse almost always plays a prominent role.
The following cases are widely cited and rather typical of the sort of case that tends to be quoted when profiling is discussed: 13 We take these examples from Ramirez et al. (2000) , but all three are widely quoted. Cf. also Harris (1999a) proportionality vis-a-vis the goals of the investigation, and proportionality as fairness. In the first case, a racial group would be investigated disproportionately if its members were screened more (or less) than is useful to pursue the goals of the investigation. In the second case, investigation would be disproportionate if fairness, say, in the distribution of burdens, were violated. Much indignation about profiling arises because it seems to affect minorities "disproportionately;" but it is not always clear which sense of proportionality 15 Some may be inclined to argue that abuse and profiling are not independent. The following claims seem to us to be true, and they justify our thesis that police abuse and racial profiling are independent issues: (1) If police abuse simply ceased to occur, profiling would still be an effective means to crime reduction, but would also still be in need of justification. (2) If no racial profiling occurred, police abuse would still persist. Claims (1) and (2) are consistent with the following claims: (3) Racial profiling plays some causal role in the occurrence of abuse. (For example, both racial minorities and police are "repeat players;" they encounter each other frequently and thus their interactions are shaped by frustration acquired in past encounters.) (4) Police abuse helps stimulate some of the activities that racial profiling is intending to reduce. (The perception of the police as a hostile force may increase one's willingness to commit certain crimes.) (5) Some police officers practice racial profiling predominantly as a form of harassment, and thus the practice of racial profiling brings about many situations in which police abuse becomes possible to begin with. We do not take a view on whether (3), (4), and (5) are true. Part of our position, then, is that there can be profiling without police abuse. One specific form of police abuse is misuse of police discretion. In light of the persistent racial problems in the U.S, police discretion should not be exercised to pursue minorities disproportionately for petty traffic offenses, which have few implications for other crimes. Such use of discretion seems to have higher costs than benefits and should be rejected. Plausibly, however, minorities are tracked down for such offenses just because racial profiling is frowned on by the public. Thus, individual police officers are looking for justifications other than racial or ethnic membership to search or investigate minorities in cases in which they are really interested in screening minorities because of some underlying crime pattern. If so, this rather controversial sort of exercise of police discretion would occur much less frequently if suitable measures of racial profiling could be used officially.
is meant. Banks (2001) , for instance, introduces disproportionality into the definition of profiling, suggesting that "racial profiling constitutes the intentional consideration of race in a manner that disparately impacts certain racial minority groups, contributing to the disproportionate investigation, detention, and mistreatment of innocent members of those groups." It is unclear which sense of "disproportionate" Banks has in mind.
What we refer to when discussing the disproportionate screening of minorities is the sense of proportionality relative to the goal of the investigation. 16 We think that individuals have a legitimate complaint if racial profiling occurs in a manner disproportionate vis-a-vis the goal of the investigation. Yet it is often hard to say what counts as disproportionate in that sense. One reasonable goal for screening is to pursue the strategy that catches the most criminals per individual screened. Say eyewitness testimony suggests that there is a 60% chance that a crime was committed by an AfricanAmerican man, and African-American males make up 25% of the population; one should then inspect only African-American males, and mutatis mutandis for other scenarios. The reason is that an African-American male is 2.4 = 60%/25% times as likely to be guilty as 16 Proportionality as fairness appears in section 5, when we discuss non-consequentialist objections to profiling. While our discussion there will not be explicitly about proportionality, one way of looking at that section is precisely that it articulates concerns on behalf of such proportionality. One idea of proportionality motivated by fairness is that if members of a racial group G committed, say, 40% of the relevant crimes, that 40% of the searches should be targeted towards members of G. The discussion beginning in the next paragraph should show why this suggestion does not capture an idea of proportionality vis-a-vis the goals of the investigation. The same is true for the proposal that, if 40% of the inhabitants of a certain area belong to G, then 40% of the searches would have to be of them; the proposal that each perpetrator should have an equal likelihood of being apprehended; and the proposal that, for each racial group, each innocent person must have an equal likelihood of being left alone.
a person selected at random. 17 Assume that we know that 10% of a group of individuals engage in an illegal activity, but only 5% of the population at large. Targeting all inspections to the high-risk group, as opposed to the general population, doubles the number of illegals caught per inspection made.
However, even if we were sticking to an efficiency criterion for curbing crime, this "target-the-most-likely" strategy would fail. We also have to worry about deterrence. 18 If the police only went after the most likely perpetrators, others would get a "free crime:" thus police would be creating incentives for members of initially low-risk groups to commit crimes. For instance, in anti-terrorism measures, we cannot exclusively go by the group since otherwise new classes of "shoe-bombers" would emerge, and terrorist groups would redouble efforts to recruit people from untargeted groups.
Focusing energies on the basis of demographic profiles also discards useful information.
For example, in routine uses of profiling for intercepting drug traffic or seizing illegal weapons, indicators beyond race and gender are telling. A Caucasian American talking to a Colombian drug dealer on the street at midnight is more likely to be involved in drug trade than a random Colombian immigrant engaged in the same activity. The number of successful arrests would be far lower if ethnicity alone were used in targeting.
17 It is not the likelihood that the criminal is from a particular group that determines the expected payoff per person searched. It is that likelihood divided by the proportion of that group in the population. 18 The dangers of over-reliance on race are illustrated by the recent experience with the Washington-area sniper in fall 2002, where on the basis of past experience with serial killers, the authorities judged that the perpetrator was a white man working alone. One consequence was that the two African-American perpetrators, working together, are believed to have passed through road blocks despite incriminating evidence in their van.
The efficient screening procedure -that is, the optimal mix across groups and thus the one that involves proportionate screening in the sense intended here --will take into account deterrence, the likelihood that members of different groups have engaged in criminal activities, and the import of non-demographic indicators of criminal activity.
(Some additional complications arise because people can be grouped in different ways; but we will ignore such complications.) Screening of some individuals from all groups, albeit with different probabilities, also indicates that we are not subjecting specific groups to actions that we would not impose on others; it is the frequency of the actions, not the actions themselves, that differs across groups.
The considerations that determine the appropriate mix and thus fix what "disproportionate" means are complex. Given that security is a concern, that search resources are limited, and that the disruption caused is a cost, search probabilities must attend to the relative risk ratio for different groups. The relative risk ratio is the likelihood that a random member of one group committed a (the) crime as opposed to a random person in another group. But the risk ratio should be only one of a number of considerations.
One implication of this point is that the benchmark of appropriate proportionate search will be hard to establish, and controversial in itself. Thus complaints that members of a certain group are investigated "disproportionately" will tend to be difficult to assess. But to the extent that they can be made credible, we endorse them, and submit that, alongside police abuse, disproportionate screening of minorities must be condemned even if one endorses (as we do) the use of race in police investigations. We are aware that critics often do not think of disproportionaltiy vis-à-vis the goals of the investigation when complaining that minorities are affected disproportionately by such measures. Yet section 5 offers reasons why there is no legitimate complaint drawing on the disproportionate distribution of burdens.
We also assume that, if profiling is practiced to begin with, it must be applied across the board, other things being equal. It is illegitimate for a jurisdiction to apply racial profiling only in cases in which the targets are minorities, but not when the priority targets would be mostly whites. For instance, one practice that some jurisdictions find useful for crime reduction is to stop African-American drivers in neighborhoods where few or no African-Americans live. But that jurisdiction may also have good reason to stop whites in African-American areas, for instance, because they are likely to be looking for drugs. Or that same jurisdiction may also have good reason to keep an eye on young people, of whatever race, driving around in a retirement community. What this all amounts to depends on the respective jurisdiction, but if profiling of high-risk groups is applied, it should be applied regardless of which group would be the primary target in a particular case. Police should be seen to apply profiling even-handedly.
3.3 We conclude with two remarks. First, it is sometimes pointed out that many AfricanAmericans do time for crimes that should not be crimes to begin with, that is, allegedly victimless drug-related offenses. Therefore, to screen African-Americans differentially compounds the error. However, the question of whether certain drugs should be legalized or their possession should not be penalized, is a different matter. We are interested in the legitimacy of profiling given that certain minorities are more likely to commit certain crimes that society takes seriously, whatever those crimes are. If drugs are legalized or their possession ignored, and membership in minorities is not correlated with other criminal activity, the question addressed in this paper no longer arises.
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Second, it is sometimes argued that there is a moral difference between using race as one of many criteria for profiling and using race as the only criterion; at any rate, the use of race as one of several criteria for profiling strikes many people as more innocuous than using race as the only criterion. 20 One might be tempted to dismiss this as plainly false: for in both cases race is being used to narrow down a group, except that in the first case the group that is being narrowed down is "all individuals (say, within a certain jurisdiction)," whereas in the second case it is "all individuals who also meet other criteria." However, this temptation must be resisted in light of what Kagan (1988) calls the additive fallacy and of what Kamm (1996) calls the principle of contextual interaction. Kagan and Kamm warn us that moral factors may not play the same role and carry the same weight in different contexts, and may contribute to moral assessments in ways that turn on other factors present in the respective situation. Thus Kagan and Kamm caution us to resist the inference from the claim that the use of some factor (here: race) is problematic in a context in which it appears by itself, to the claim that, therefore, the use of this factor is still problematic even if other factors are present. Nevertheless, it seems 19 For a defense of the position that drugs should be legalized, see Husak (1992) . It has been suggested to us that the question of which crimes "society takes seriously" may all by itself be a racist matter: it is because of irrational fear of black violence and general black-led moral decay that police spend so high a proportion of their effort on fighting "black" crimes, and as a result even innocent blacks are more likely to be the subject of police attention. We find it hard to assess this claim, but if it is true it would certain complicate the situation. 20 There are obvious parallels here to the affirmative action debate relating to higher education. There, race is but one of many factors, a critical ethical matter for many observers.
fair to say that the use of race still stands in need of justification if race is used in conjunction with other factors; and this is so although it does not simply follow from the fact that the use of race in isolation poses a problem. Using race as the only criterion would be absurd. For it would mean investigating people who on different grounds are likely to be innocent while not investigating others whose characteristics make them much more likely to be guilty. Factors other than race will almost always be helpful.
The Utilitarian Argument
4.1 For the remainder of this study, we will be talking about racial profiling in the broad sense defined in 2.1, and with the understanding that (a) police abuse is a different problem that needs addressing anyway, and that (b) screening of minorities out of proportion to what is useful to the goals of the investigation is illegitimate.
Racial profiling is commonly justified on utilitarian grounds. Certain crimes, so the argument goes, are committed disproportionately by certain racial groups. Thus special efforts at crime reduction directed at members of minorities are justified, if not required.
Kennedy (1999) The argument that it is not profiling itself that is offensive requires more probing, since much turns on it. Profiling appears to stir two types of resentment. First, individuals may feel resentment because the property in terms of which they are profiled partly constitutes their identity. Resentment in such cases is motivated by emotions ranging from shame to indignation as a reaction to the fact that part of what one is first and 22 We use the term "primary cause" a fair number of times in a rather loose sense over the next pages. But the term should be clear enough, and nothing would be gained by being more cautious in our causation vocabulary.
foremost has come under suspicion. Second, they may feel resentment because they are treated in terms of a group-membership at the exclusion of their (other) individual properties and thus feels treated not as they deserve. For example, a black school principal who has never had a brush with the law may be pulled over, whereas ne'er do wells, with many past violations and run ins are allowed to drive by. In some instances, people will feel resentment for both reasons. The second form of resentment does not depend on why one is targeted. While this form of resentment does not conform to the thesis we submitted in the preceding paragraph --that profiling as such does not cause harm, but only does so if the reason why one is profiled is independently associated with harm --, it can be eased straightforwardly. Once people understand why it makes sense under the circumstances to treat them in terms of one of their properties, they are likely to acquiesce, though perhaps with a residue of resentment. At any rate, it would be reasonable to expect such acquiescence. It is not a problem that this form of resentment does not conform to our thesis. For the first form of resentment, however, it seems true that the degree to which one feels resentment depends on the regard in which that property is held, and so does one's willingness or ability to acquiesce. This is all that matters for our argument. This is also reflected in our examples. Being profiled in terms of one's age group does not hurt, at least in cultures admiring youth. 23 However, racial profiling does because it brings to the fore underlying hurt in a race-sensitive society.
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23 Consider the case of higher car insurance rights for young drivers. They could complain that it is not their fault that they are presently at a certain age range and that this fact should not entail that they end up with high insurance rates. In response, one could point to the overall higher accident risk that young people carry, and in addition, that everybody goes through this age range and will later be in a position to benefit from lower rates. It seems that once this is explained, acquiescence can reasonably be expected. -Gender here presents an interesting case. In some jurisdications, such as 4.2 However, arguing that racial profiling itself is not the "primary cause" of the pain and frustration triggered by racial profiling is but the first step in objecting to Kennedy's argument. What must be assessed as well is whether the incremental damage done to, say, the African-American community from profiling is itself not too large for it to outweigh the advantages gained by crime reduction. This calculation of incremental damage should be conducted taking as given current practices of society (such as racism and racial disparities). This requirement makes our argument more difficult. The argument in 4.1 seems to provide some basis to think that even using this criterion the incremental costs of profiling are not too great, but it would not be unreasonable for some doubts to persist. Acts of profiling inflicted upon, say, individual African-Americans, and the expectation of future occurrences of such measures that African-Americans share also contribute to the frustration caused (and thus to the costs incurred) by racial profiling.
It would be hard to assess conclusively the harm caused by profiling all by itself over and above the harm that can be traced to underlying racism and disadvantage. is convicted? Could it lead to police corruption? Could it provide incentives for people to try to get stopped? All this would have to be worked out in detail. In addition, there is also the objection that such compensation could be seen as insulting: after all, if police work is done properly, one may argue, subjecting oneself to certain types of police measures should be regarded as a civic duty. Again, more discussion is needed. 26 It may not be possible, without much bureaucratic effort, to make this compensation fair in each case, but the compensation system should work in such a way that compensation is fair on average. (A similar case would be an airline that gives people $100 if a plane is delayed a certain while; on average, this might be fair even if some people are damaged to a larger extent. A compensation system could be implemented in the airport context, though this would require an increased ticket price.) 27 At the same time, however, we believe that our argument shows that racial profiling is justified even if no compensatory measures are taken. Given the sizeable losses already imposed by racism, the importance of incremental losses is not clear. Prospect Theory finds empirical evidence that although individuals are risk averse with respect to gains, they are risk taking on losses. That is, although the utility curve for gains is concave, that for losses is convex. If true, that would suggest the incremental costs imposed by profiling are actually less given the severe losses imposed by other measures. Cf. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) .
4.3 Let us consider one objection to our claim that the primary cause of frustration among minorities is underlying racism or underlying socio-economic disadvantage, rather than profiling as such. One might object that the harms of racism are caused by the composition of many practices, none of which is "fundamental" or "underlying." Some of these practices have to do with economic opportunity and inequality. Others have to do with the subtle kinds of disrespect at work and in public that some have called "second generation discrimination." A third kind of racism is discrimination by public institutions:
an important example would be police profiling. The African-American "finds that the most prominent reminder of his second-class citizenship are the police." 28 The thrust of the objection is to argue that we are mistaken in thinking of racial profiling merely as an epiphenomenon, that is, a practice above and beyond those practices that are constitutive of racial discrimination; instead, racial profiling is partly and perhaps even largely constitutive of the racist reality of the U.S.
In response, our argument seems to succeed regardless of whether one thinks of profiling as an epiphenomenon or takes it to be a practice that (partly) constitutes racial discrimination. The crucial point remains that racial profiling all by itself does not cause the preponderance of the harm and frustration many people think it causes. The same considerations apply to this description of the role of profiling. The difference is merely whether one talks about "the other practices constitutive of racial discrimination," or "the underlying practices of racial discrimination." Yet this objection makes it worthwhile to 28 Quote taken from Kennedy (1997) , p 152. Kennedy quotes here an essay written by African-American police officer Don Jackson, who moved about in Long Beach, California, after dark and without the protection of his uniform. A camera team followed him and filmed the ensuing rather unpleasant encounters with the police. He later wrote an essay about his experiences as a victim of racially selective police practices.
further develop our point. It would be all too easy to think about the removal of racial discrimination in terms of stopping racial profiling. Deeper-reaching measures are required to resolve such injustice. Plausibly, the disproportionate tendency of minorities to engage in criminal activity is itself, to some extent, a symptom of racial discrimination.
But the appropriate response is to remove the causes of those symptoms, rather than to stop taking such symptoms seriously as the statistical indictors they happen to be.
In sum, we have seen that, on utilitarian grounds, racial profiling may well be justified. To obtain a full utilitarian argument in support of profiling we would have to look carefully at racial disparities in crime statistics and ponder the impact of racial profiling on crime reduction. Since the utilitarian argument turns on empirical questions, it might support racial profiling in some contexts but not in others. Even where profiling reduces crime, there may be a more palatable alternative to it that brings about (nearly) the same benefits without incurring the same costs. The crucial point remains that the benefits must outweigh the costs, and to a larger extent than available alternatives. Yet this section submits a way of thinking about the costs that renders it plausible that at least in some contexts where it would be controversial, profiling is justified on the basis of a utilitarian calculation. For instance, our reasoning might support focused searches for contraband in certain neighborhoods with the aid of profiling. It seems less plausible that drug searches on the New Jersey Turnpike will be supported by this reasoning. For the prospects of diminishing drug traffic by intercepting cars on major highways seem rather slim. The costs of Turnpike stops-and-searches may outweigh the benefits even on the understanding of costs that we have submitted here. 29 But the utilitarian verdict on what should be done must turn on empirical facts.
Non-Consequentialist Arguments
5.1 There are well-known worries about utilitarianism, in particular that it does not, in Rawls' words, respect the separateness of persons, or, in Williams's words, respect an individual's integrity. 30 Utilitarianism may recommend impinging upon the well-being of individuals or groups for the sake of the welfare of society. So it may seem unsurprising that utilitarianism does not effectively articulate objections to profiling. We now investigate whether objections to profiling can be based on rights-and fairness-based grounds. Such approaches emphasize the avoidance of wrong-doing, rather than the performance of good deeds. First, we ask whether profiling constitutes pejorative discrimination, and second, we ask whether profiling imposes unfair burdens on certain minorities. We emphasize two points from the start. First, we are not concerned with exploring foundational questions about, say, rights, and thus will inevitably beg many questions in that regard. Second, we do not claim that we exhaust the reasons why nonconsequentialists may object to profiling. We do, however, think that the two arguments we explore in this section are the most important non-consequentialist objections to 29 The New York Times reports evidence to the contrary. According to an article by D. Kocieniewski and R. Hanley published on December 3, 2000 (Section 1, Page 53, Column 2), in the mid-1980s, the federal Drug Enforcement Administration started to enlist local police forces to catch smugglers who imported drugs from Latin America, often to Florida, and then moved them to major American cities by car. By 1989, "the New Jersey State Police had become such a successful part of 'Operation Pipeline' that D.E.A. officials hailed the troopers as exemplary models for most other states."
profiling, and that our study (both the argumentative sections 4, 5, and 6, and the conceptual sections 2 and 3) provides resources to address other possible nonconsequentialist objections.
If racial profiling violates any rights, it is plausible to think that such violations occur because profiling is discriminatory in the pejorative sense. 31 To fix ideas, we take pejorative discrimination to be differential treatment among groups -e.g., based on gender, race or sexual orientation --with either the intention or the effect of maintaining or establishing an oppressive relationship among such groups, or any other relationship that keeps some such groups at a socially disadvantaged status (or relegates them to such a status to begin with). So in that sense, "separate but equal" facilities were discriminatory; so was college admissions employing geographical criteria to keep the number of Jews low, and so was the exclusion of women from many occupations for which gender is irrelevant. Yet affirmative action in higher education is not pejorative So is profiling pejorative discrimination? One might say that, even if one distinguishes among police abuse, disproportionate use of race for police tactics, and the use of race as such, profiling still has negative effects on minority communities and is discriminatory even if the intent of the relevant policy makers was innocuous. For by using race in police tactics, one maintains a social reality that should be overcome.
However, this claim is insufficient to show that profiling is pejorative discrimination. To show this, we argue that (a) profiling can be justified on legitimate grounds, and that (b) profiling as such does not perpetuate a socially disadvantageous status. Both arguments are very straightforward at this stage.
We begin with (a). The use of race for police investigations can be motivated on legitimate grounds, namely its contribution to crime fighting. However, individual police officers might be involved in profiling with the malicious purpose to harm groups collectively, or individuals specifically, although the relevant policy may not be discriminatory. Or, there might be legitimate reasons for policy makers to adopt profiling, and they might well announce those reasons, but their motivations to adopt the measure may be different from (and more pernicious than) what they say they were. These cases would represent pejorative discrimination. Let us proceed to (b). For this point we can borrow from section 4: the extent to which an oppressive or otherwise disadvantageous relationship among (in this case) racial groups stems from profiling as such is rather small. What is discriminatory is abusive policing and the disproportionate use of race in police tactics. (Recall that by "disproportionate use of race in police tactics we mean "more than is valuable in reducing crime.") Yet profiling is not discriminatory once we distinguish among the relevant issues (abuse, disproportionality, use of race). The use of race as such does not amount to pejorative discrimination.
If racial profiling were pejorative discrimination, a follow-up question would arise:
Are there competing considerations that overturn the conclusion that profiling is wrong?
The concept of discrimination is difficult and open to disagreements, and thus we must address somebody who disagrees with our assessment. Suppose, then, profiling is pejorative discrimination. Might it still be justified? It is tempting to argue as follows:
Individuals have a right to security, on the one hand, and a right not to be exposed to pejorative discrimination, on the other. These rights may conflict. If they do, they must be balanced against each other, and this balancing can only be done on consequentialist grounds. If profiling helps noticeably to reduce crime, while not contributing much to the perpetuation of pejorative discrimination overall, profiling will be justified even if it is such discrimination. Our argument in section 4 supports such reasoning.
But this argument falsely assumes that no priority is to be given to either right. A core idea of many non-consequentialist positions is that innocent, non-threatening persons have a right not to be attacked, and everybody has a duty to refrain from attacking such persons. 33 Yet that is different from saying that such persons have a right to government prevention from attacks by others. If the government does not protect its citizens from attacks, it does not violate their rights not to be attacked, as it does not attack them. But if it pejoratively discriminates against them, it does attack them, or does something relevantly similar, and thus violates their rights. Thus refraining from pejorative discrimination, as an instance of refraining from attacking innocent persons, is a constraint on promoting security, rather than a factor to be balanced against it. So if profiling is pejorative discrimination, then the right not to be exposed to profiling will be stronger than the right to be protected from crimes. Thus one must not reduce crime at the expense of violating rights. So if profiling is discrimination in the pejorative sense (as we argued it is not), non-consequentialists possess a very strong reason to reject it.
5.3 Non-consequentialists, however, may worry about profiling even if they grant that it is not discriminatory in the pejorative sense. For there are other ways of harming people than discriminating against them. In particular, even if profiling is not discrimination, some people are still asked to contribute more than others to the provision of security, a public good that all desire. Such disparities in contribution require a justification. By way of providing such a justification, note first that it is not uncommon that public goods are provided in ways that do not burden everybody equally. For example, it is in the public 33 This claim comes with certain qualifications that are tied to certain well-known debates among non-consequentialists: whether or not there is a moral difference between doing and letting happen, between intending and merely foreseeing, and how to integrate aggregation into deontological accounts. (Cf. Kamm (2000) for an overview of these issues.) Also, what counts as an attack must be assessed as well. However, nothing is gained for our argument by discussing such complexities.
interest for airports to have adequate capacity, but the construction disruption, noise, and ultimate decrease in property value from new runways is imposed only on those who live nearby; securing adequate tax revenues is brought about by taxing higher incomes more and auditing people in some modes of employment more than others; students and the elderly are charged lower fees for participating in certain activities, and those who drive on toll roads must pay but not those driving on smaller byways.
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Burdens are also distributed unequally in the provision of security. If a draft is imposed, it is frequently imposed only on young men, although the whole population is protected; and for many nations, border regions bear more military burdens than interior areas. This is readily explained: Not everybody is in a position to contribute as much to the realization of a public good as others. (The expression "to be in a position" covers many different cases.) Protecting health bears parallels to security. In the U.S., to stop venereal diseases from spreading we used to trace the contacts of infected people.
Today, we impose severely on tubercular patients, making them come to a clinic to complete their medicine regimen. Failing that we chase them. If worst comes to worst, they are quarantined. We impose public-good generating behavior on these afflicted individuals because that is virtually the only way to protect the population against tuberculosis.
Differential burdens for the realization of public goods may be efficient and fairly common, but their desirability alone cannot justify them, nor can efficiency. To mention an extreme example, if scientists can find a cure for cancer by killing somebody with a distinctive genetic makeup, it would be wrong to do so. Similarly, it seems wrong to impose different punishments for the same offenses, other things being equal, depending on the culprit's neighborhood, in order to target neighborhoods where more deterrence would be desirable. Still, there are conditions under which it seems reasonable to impose differential burdens. To see this, consider a sketchy account of a society characterized by reasonable social harmony, or Functioning Reciprocity: In a society like this, the imposition of a draft could be justified under suitable conditions, as could the differential imposition of financial burdens in support of a health care system, and the imposition of racial profiling. At this stage, we encounter substantial questions about the foundations of rights, the scope and limit of state power, and so on, questions that go beyond what we can address here. But even without filling in such details, it seems fair to say that this idea of a society characterized by Functioning Reciprocity, properly expanded, provides resources to justify the imposition of differential burdens in a broad range of cases without allowing for extreme cases such as the two just mentioned above, or other aberrations such as police abuse. It seems that under such circumstances individuals do not have reasonable complaints if they are affected by the imposition of differential burdens in the provision of public goods although they may never have explicitly agreed to it (or in fact may have explicitly opposed the imposition of burdens that so affect them), and although they themselves may not benefit from the system overall. For instance, an individual soldier drafted into the army in such a society would not have a legitimate complaint against this measure even if he could prove that he does not benefit from this system. Now suppose we live in a society characterized by less harmony than envisaged by Functioning Reciprocity. Suppose it is not widely acknowledged (perhaps because it is not true) that this sort of differential imposition of burdens is maintained across public goods and works, by and large, to society's advantage. Suppose now we have a public good that can only be supplied if burdens are imposed differentially, and that this good is widely acknowledged across social groups to be of tremendous importance. Suppose also that a group that would carry a substantial burden is publicly opposed to it. Given these differences to Functioning Reciprocity, can we formulate a condition under which this imposition would be justified? It seems we can. A sufficient condition for imposing unequal burdens under these circumstances is that those who are burdened more than others are net beneficiaries from the good. If the unequal imposition of a burden is counterbalanced by the unequal benefit that the relevant group gains in this manner, the unequal burden is not an undue burden. We think that a case can be made for justifying the use of race in police tactics along such lines, with the good in question being security.
What needs to be shown to that end is that, indeed, the affected minorities are net beneficiaries. We will so argue in section 6. Once that argument is in place, we revisit this objection about the unfair imposition of burdens.
5.4
We have investigated two non-consequentialist objections to profiling ("racial profiling is discrimination in the pejorative sense," and "profiling imposes unfair burdens") but there may remain other non-consequentialist objections to profiling. This leaves our argument subject to revision if other objections should emerge, but our discussion should at least provide some resources to address additional objections; in particular, we think that our discussion (including the discussion of conceptual issues in sections 2 and 3) offers resources to address claims that other specific rights are being violated by racial profiling. At any rate, those two objections strike us as the strongest objections to profiling along non-consequentialist lines.
We conclude this section with two remarks. First, the fact that African-Americans remain disadvantaged in the U.S. provides strong reasons to adopt policies to change this situation. Possible measures range from race-blind programs that de facto differentially help African-Americans (e.g., Head Start), to race-regarding affirmative action programs, to reparations for African-Americans in the aftermath of slavery. Regardless of how these measures are assessed, any of them is consistent with our argument that racial profiling does not constitute pejorative discrimination and does not impose an unfair burden. This is worth emphasizing, since there seems to be a perception that no form of racial profiling can be justified from any other than a racist point of view, or from a point of view that is callous towards the subtleties of the issues raised by racial profiling.
Our second remark concerns an objection to our argument. One might argue that when concerns about security and concerns about pejorative discrimination conflict, measures must be taken to resolve the conflict. For instance, in the airport screening scenario, we should search everybody. 35 That measure would be expensive in either the number of security agents required or the amount of time passengers would have to spend going through security measures. But this sort of measure is simply what it takes jointly to work toward a just society. In response, note first that the airport scenario is special in several ways. To begin with, there are comparatively few people who must be searched at an airport, as opposed to, say, all individuals traveling on a certain highway: searching everybody on a certain highway would be impossible, practically speaking. Moreover, one can announce these measures in advance and thus prepare passengers for the inconvenience. Even targeted groups of passengers can observe that many non-targeted passengers are subject to the same disruptive action. Finally, high security prior to boarding a plane is easy to justify to passengers since 9/11 and the Shoe-bomber incident.
(There were no hijackings in the U.S. in many years prior to 9/11, so the inspections did not seem to make sense, or would have to be motivated by rather general security 35 Kennedy (1997) , p 161 makes this proposal, among others. Yet this proposal also leads to problems of its own. If we adopt this proposal because now some people carry an undue burden of the costs of security by virtue of their race, then this point will still hold true once the new proposal is implemented. For it would mean searching people whose race is a rather good indicator of innocence. Apart from raising fairness concerns of its own, such measures might also lead to their own sort of resentment. Consider how the two proposals would withstand the publicity test. Suppose (a) we announced that special search procedures applied to members of certain racial groups because of the predictive value that their race has for certain crimes. And suppose (b) we announce that universally strict search procedures applied to everybody so that no single group would have to be isolated due to the predictive role their race has for certain crimes. At the very least, it is far from obvious that (b) would pass such a (Kantian) publicity test better than (a).
concerns.) None of these ameliorating factors holds with respect to most searches and investigations on highways or on neighborhood streets. "Searching everybody" is not an option outside confined scenarios, and cannot be the guiding maxim of routine police and security measures aimed at crime reduction. So for such scenarios, all the objector can ask is a mitigation, rather than a resolution, of the relevant conflict.
At any rate, this proposal strikes us as wrongheaded. Since this objector is unwilling to be guided by racial, ethnic, and national indicators in her efforts to reduce crime, her proposal must allocate significantly more resources, say X more, to achieve the same level of security. Such resources, it seems to us, are much better spent if allocated to eradicate, say, underlying racism rather than for measures designed to ignore its symptoms. If only a portion of X were spent this way (and it seems unlikely at this time that more than a portion of X would be so spent), the outcome would still be superior for African-Americans. That is so in particular since, as we have argued in section 4, the incremental harm inflicted by racial profiling as such is comparatively low to begin with.
The Self-Interest Argument
6.1 We now explore the argument that profiling is in the interest of the targeted racial community. We focus on the African-American community, but similar arguments apply to other cases. One may think that discussing the argument from self-interest at all is in bad taste. Yet historically, a major component of police racism took the form of underenforcement, ignoring black-on-black crime. Considering possible deterrence strengthens the argument. If members of a racial group know that they are targeted by police measures more than average, they will be disproportionately deterred from becoming criminals. This will decrease the need to 36 See crime reports for empirical confirmation of these claims: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/race.htm. It should be noticed that such a generational contract burdens men more than women, but we neglect this aspect in the current discussion. We assume that the amount to which African-American crime affects African-American victims is not so overwhelming that African-American crime becomes a problem purely internal to the African-American community (in which case we would have to reconsider the utilitarian argument developed in section 3). We also disregard the fact that in particular young men with a penchant for crime would not benefit from this arrangement. We do not think that this fact undermines our argument. A parallel argument applies if either majority rule voting or pluralistic politics is employed to make decisions. With majority rule, the median voter along the ideological spectrum determines the outcome. In the U.S., that voter is white. Median voters are likely to be more disposed to policies that help African-Americans (e.g., spending on schools, or health for the poor) if they feel that African-Americans are supportive of the welfare of the polity. 40 The world of pluralistic politics is messier; policies reflect the tugand-haul among constituency groups as they seek to influence elected and appointed leaders. In the struggle and negotiation that ensues, whites play a major role. If they are not paying a big "tax" in the crime area, whites will be more sympathetic to outcomes favoring African-Americans.
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.3 Yet many African-Americans would have little enthusiasm for any strand of the selfinterest argument. They reason that an unfair process cannot be to their advantage.
Profiling entails measures executed by officials of an establishment that, historically, has been responsible for the African-American plight. Moreover, it is directed at crimes they are more likely to commit than others at least partly because of this background. 41 Since police abuse and profiling are often perceived as one and the same problem, AfricanAmericans understandably reject profiling. The motivations of the "profilers" are also 40 On the Median Voter Theorem, cf. Downs (1957) . 41 However, in light of the sheer amount of black-on-black crime, it might not always be so clear what "the community" wants.
suspect; not many police officers are strongly moved by the interests of the AfricanAmerican community.
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The situation is peculiar. Though an argument can be made that more effective crime fighting measures that impose special burdens on the African-American community are to their own advantage, it appears that African-American communities themselves oppose such measures. Moreover, given the connection between police abuse and racial profiling, they have good reasons to oppose. Given that African-American communities would likely reject the self-interest argument restricts its usefulness in support of racial profiling. To justify racial profiling because it helps African-Americans, despite their rejection, we would have to resort to paternalistic arguments, a course we do not wish to pursue. To make the argument from self-interest to support profiling, without raising worries about democratic legitimacy, measures must be taken to secure democratic endorsement of profiling by African-American communities. Such measures would include steps to reduce police abuse, but would also require a sustained dialogue to assess other concerns of the African-American community.
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Even if self-interest as a justification for racial profiling fails in its own right, an appeal to self-interest can still be used for at least two purposes. First, given the view that More importantly for our argument, an appeal to self-interest also completes our response to the objection that profiling unfairly imposes burdens considered in 5.3. We suggested that (under the circumstances outlined in 5.3) it would be wrong to say that minority communities bear an unfair burden in the provision of the public good of security if they also benefited equivalently from such profiling more than other communities do. It seems fair to say now that that is indeed so. 
Conclusion
A few lingering questions remain. For instance: what do we say to individual AfricanAmericans who are reluctant to be on the streets after dark because they either do not want to be exposed to any measures of racial profiling, or are afraid of police abuse? In addition to pointing out again that we insist on the importance of ending police abuse and disproportionate screening of minorities in the sense discussed in section 3 (and that, indeed, we believe that profiling without abuse is possible), we can take the beginnings of an answer from the observation that other people, or indeed the same people looking from a different perspective, would have a complaint if we did not take measures to reduce crime. It is easy to point to people who are subject to racial profiling. By contrast, people protected by measures that fight crime usually remain statistical figures, though their interests are no less legitimate for that, and they are no less real. 46 But to the extent that such people exist, and to the extent that they are protected from serious harm, racial profiling seems justified. Cases like Randolph's (the dentist who was stopped many times) are unfortunate, but not unjustifiable, to the extent that they are cases of racial profiling per se (given suitable assumptions on the effectiveness of such measures overall). But recall that this study also suggested compensation for the inconvenience caused by acts of profiling.
More creative techniques for dealing with the issues raised by profiling merit serious attention. In airport security, for example, trials are being made with retinascanning identity cards that would whisk through individuals who acquired them, presumably mostly frequent travelers. If Elmo Randolph had the option of posting an electronic card on his vehicle, which would record that he had been checked previously, that information -which would make him low-priority for stopping --could be scanned remotely by the police. Discussing such measures in detail would lead us too far afield.
46 If the crime prevention works through deterrence, or because criminals are removed from the streets, we rarely learn who the victim would have been. We do know when criminals are caught in the act.
To sum up our findings, then: We began by investigating the utilitarian argument against racial profiling, and found it wanting. Instead, we suggested a way of thinking about the costs of racial profiling that will give support to racial profiling in a broad range of cases, including presumably many that are quite controversial. Needless to say, this argument does not support racial profiling in every circumstance; the final verdict at the policy level will depend on the relevant facts, that is, how much crime is reduced given any level of imposition. We then investigated deontological complaints against racial profiling and found those wanting as well. We found that the use of race in police tactics does not constitute pejorative discrimination, and we also found that racial profiling does not impose an unfair burden on minorities. This argument turned on the claim that minorities also benefit disproportionately from racial profiling and thus on the argument from self-interest, which we investigated last. This argument faces a problem of legitimacy as long as the relevant communities themselves do not endorse it, assuming that it is used as a complete justification of racial profiling. We did find, however, that this argument can be used to reject doubts about a duty of compliance on the side of the African-American community, and that it can be used to complete our rebuttal of concerns about the undue imposition of burdens on minority communities. This argument may sound alienating. That might be because the use of race in police tactics is often connected -in perception or reality --with police abuse or the disproportionate use of race in such tactics. When they are connected, that blocks a clear ethical assessment of racial profiling. A main message of this essay is that these subjects must be discussed separately, at both the normative and policy levels.
